Duncan v Baird
| Jurisdiction | Anguilla |
| Judge | Michel, J.A. |
| Judgment Date | 14 July 2014 |
| Neutral Citation | AI 2014 CA 1 |
| Docket Number | AXAHCVAP 8 of 2012 |
| Court | Court of Appeal (Anguilla) |
| Date | 14 July 2014 |
Court of Appeal
Pereira, C.J.; Michel, J.A.; Chong, J.A. (Ag.)
AXAHCVAP 8 of 2012
Mr. Dane Hamilton, QC, with him, Ms. Josephine Gumbs-Connor and Ms. Yanique Stewart for the appellant.
Ms. Tara Carter-Ruan and Ms. Kristy Richardson for the respondent.
Defamation - Libel and slander — Appeal against the decision that the words were defamatory — Whether the trial judge erred in concluding that the words complained of do not fall within what can reasonably be considered as comment — Public interest element — Whether the words complained of concerning the behaviour and performance in office of a Member of Parliament and a Minister of Government fell within the ambit of public interest where it was established that there was a proposed cut in Ministers’ salaries — Whether the defence of fair comment was made out where the words complained of constitutes comment and not statement of facts — Appeal allowed
The respondent, a Minister of Government and an elected member of the Anguilla House of Assembly, commenced legal proceedings against the appellant for defamation for words spoken by the appellant at a public political rally (which was carried live on a local radio station). The respondent alleged that the words were understood to mean that he is lazy and is not functioning, that he and the Governor are part of a conspiracy, and that he does not have the country at heart and instead has used people to get elected for the money. The appellant, who, like the respondent, is a member of AUM, denied that the words were defamatory of the respondent and asserted that they were fair comment on a matter of public interest and/or were published on an occasion of qualified privilege.
The learned trial judge gave judgment against the appellant. The appellant appealed, asserting inter alia that the learned trial judge erred in concluding that the words complained of do not fall within what can reasonably be considered as comment and that the appellant had failed to prove the factual basis of the comment and had misstated the facts. Further, the learned judge misdirected himself on the evidence and/or erred in law in concluding that there was no duty - legal, social or moral - for the appellant to make the statements which he did.
Held: allowing the appeal and awarding prescribed costs in the appeal and in the court below, that:
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1. A comment may contain an opinion, but it is not itself necessarily an opinion and there may be words spoken or written which constitute comment but which are neither expressions of opinion nor assertions of fact. A comment is often distinguished by the use of metaphors. The use of metaphors throughout the words complained of distinguish the words as comment and not statements of fact.
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2. It is a defence to a claim of defamation that the words complained of are fair comment on a matter of public interest. It was an established fact that there was a proposed cut in Ministers’ salaries by the AUM-led Government. Additionally, the respondent had conceded that he did not agree to the proposed salary cut. Having regard to the factual basis of the comment, the appellant's comment was one which might fairly be made out.
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3. Defamatory words spoken or written in circumstances which attract qualified privilege and which were not proven to be actuated by malice are protected from liability. A privileged occasion is an occasion where the person who makes a communication has an interest, or a duty - legal, social or moral - to make it to the person to whom it is made, and the person to whom it is so made has a corresponding interest or duty to receive it. Having regard to the fact that the appellant was a member of the AUM who had an interest in the behaviour and performance of the respondent as a Legislator and Minister and had spoken words which were not proven to be actuated by malice, and having regard to the interest which party supporters and members of the Anguillan public who are likely to listen to speeches delivered at political rallies would have in the behaviour and performance of the respondent as Legislator and Minister, the occasion of the making of the statements by the appellant at the political rally would attract qualified privilege and the appellant would be protected by qualified privilege from liability for defamation.
The appellant and the respondent were at all material times members of the Anguilla United Movement (“AUM”) - the governing party in the British Overseas Territory of Anguilla. The respondent is and was at all material times an elected member of the House of Assembly and the Minister for Health and Social Development of Anguilla, having been elected to the House of Assembly as a member of the AUM at the general election in February 2010 and then appointed as a Minister on the advice of the leader of the AUM and Chief Minister of the Territory, Mr. Hubert Hughes.
Between February 2010 and January 2011, relations between the respondent and other members of the AUM party and government had become strained to the point where the leader of the party and the government, Mr. Hubert Hughes, had advised the Governor to relieve the respondent of the health portfolio, which the Governor declined to do.
On 8th January 2011, the AUM held a public political rally (which was carried live on a local radio station) at which the appellant addressed the assembled persons. In the course of his address, the appellant said:
“I want to send the Honourable Minister, Mr. Edison Baird a strong message! You don't walk around like a chicken without a head out your body and get the people of Anguilla money, to do nothing. You think that you and the Governor can lie in bed and get away with it… when this Government went to office they decided to cut their salaries, you know what that Honourable Edison Baird said? “Don't cut my salary!” It's about money for him. It's not about his country and we had enough. You look at him, he walks around like he's in space. He's a disgrace to the people of Anguilla. He think it's all about getting elected. It is not! You don't use the people of Anguilla to get elected.”
On 3rd March 2011, the respondent instituted proceedings against the appellant for defamation, alleging that, in their natural and ordinary meaning, the words quoted above were understood to mean that the respondent is lazy and is not functioning, that he and the Governor are part of a conspiracy, and that he does not have the country at heart and instead has used people to get elected for the money. The respondent claimed damages, including exemplary damages, interest, costs, fees and other relief.
In a defence filed on 11th April 2011, the appellant admitted that he spoke the words complained of, but denied that the words bore or were capable of bearing any of the meanings alleged by the respondent or any meaning defamatory of the respondent. The appellant also alleged that insofar as the words bore the meaning alleged by the respondent, the words were fair comment on a matter of public interest and/or were published on an occasion of qualified privilege.
No reply was filed to the appellant's defence.
Upon application made to the court under rule 69.4 of the Civil Procedure Rules, 2000 (“CPR”), Master Mathurin ruled, by order dated 12th July 2011, that the words complained of were capable of bearing the meanings ascribed to them by the respondent.
At the trial of the matter on 18th June 2012, the respondent gave evidence on his own behalf and called one witness, whilst the appellant gave evidence on his own behalf and called two witnesses. On 29th June 2012, the learned trial judge gave judgment against the appellant and ordered him to pay damages to the respondent in the sum of $40,000.00, together with prescribed costs on the amount awarded and interest from the date of judgment to the date of payment.
By notice of appeal filed on 14th August 2012, the appellant appealed against the judgment of the learned trial judge on the following grounds:
“1. The learned judge misdirected himself on the evidence and/or erred in law in concluding
(i) That the words complained of do not fall within what can reasonably be considered as comment.
(ii) That there were no expressions of opinion within the said words.
(iii) That the appellant had failed to prove the factual basis of the comment and had misstated the facts.
2. The learned judge misdirected himself on the evidence and/or erred in law in concluding that there was no duty legal, social or moral for the appellant to make the statements which he did AND further that the appellant had failed to satisfy the Reynolds test.
3. That the damages as awarded by the learned trial Judge are excessive and the basis upon which the same were awarded was never pleaded or formed part of the evidence at trial.”
The appeal was heard on 2nd December 2013, with oral submissions made by counsel on behalf of the parties to augment the skeleton arguments/submissions filed by them.
Defamation, at common law, is the publication of a statement which tends to lower a person in the estimation of right-thinking members of society. To succeed in an action for defamation, therefore, a claimant must prove the making of a statement by a defendant tending to lower the claimant in the estimation of right thinking-members of the society and the publication of that statement to a third party or parties.
On the facts of the present case, it was not disputed that the appellant made and published statements concerning the respondent, and the court ruled - by order of Master Mathurin dated 12th July 2011 - that the statements were capable of bearing the defamatory meanings ascribed to them by the respondent. The order of the learned master was not appealed and it therefore fell to the trial judge to determine whether the...
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