Hughes v Hughes

• Jurisdiction: Anguilla
• Judge: Byron, J.A.
• Judgment Date: 24 May 1993
• Neutral Citation: AI 1993 CA 1
• Docket Number: Civil Appeal No. 7 of 1992
• Date: 24 May 1993
• Court: Court of Appeal (Anguilla)

Court of Appeal

Floissac, C.J.; Byron, J.A.; Liverpool, J.A.

Civil Appeal No. 7 of 1992

Hughes

and

Hughes

Appearances:

Mr. Mario Michel for the Appellant.

Miss Paulette Harrigan for the Respondent.

Family law - Divorce — Appeal — Whether trial judge erred in issuing order for ancillary relief to dissolution of marriage of the parties — Sections 25(2)(a) and 24(1)(c) of Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1990 — Benefit of a child of the family — Periodical payments — Lump sum payments — Section 27 Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1990 — Contribution — Duration of marriage — Property acquired after the separation — Periodical payments and lump sum not excessive in the circumstances — Appeal dismissed.

Byron, J.A.

1 This is an appeal against an order made by d'Auvergne, J. on 25th September 1992 for relief ancillary to the dissolution of the marriage of the parties hereto. The appellant has appealed against orders to pay the respondent;

• a. US$500.00 per month for housing accommodation for herself and the two children of the family until the younger attains the age of 18 years, and

• b. a lump sum of $40,000.00

2 on the ground that the awards are excessive and against the weight of the evidence.

3 There was no appeal against the orders for the appellant to pay $400.00 per month for maintenance for each of the two children and to provide educational books, private tuition including music lessons for them until they attain the age of 18 years.

4 The appellant and the respondent formed a romantic association in 1978 and got married in 1983. The two children of the marriage are Shani born on 2nd March 1980 and Shirba born on 21st January 1984. In April 1984, after 14 months, the marriage became irreconcilably broken down. A decree nisi of divorce was granted on 10th October 1991.

5 There was evidence before the court in the form of two affidavits sworn by the appellant, one affidavit sworn by the respondent and oral testimony from both of them.

6 This revealed that during their relationship the appellant had been a medical student and resided in Jamaica. The respondent was a civil servant and resided in Anguilla. The appellant used the entirety of his financial resources in his own educational development and it was left to the respondent to use her own resources to look after herself and the children of the family.

7 For the past thirteen years the respondent has been providing a home for the children at her own expense apart from a short time in 1983 when the parties lived with the appellant's parents when he was at home on vacation from University. She now provides accommodation for them at a rental of US$500.00 per month. There was nothing to suggest that this was an extravagant expenditure. The order for the appellant to pay this sum for the 11 years until Shirba reaches 18 years could be regarded as a method of compelling him to contribute to the parental obligation of providing shelter for the children of the family.

8 The breakdown of the marriage coincided with the appellant's return to Anguilla as a medical practitioner in 1984. Since then the parties have lived separate and apart.

9 The evidence disclosed that the respondent's salary was $2,080.00 subject to an increment of $50.00 per year, and that as she had already reached the level of executive officer the prospects of substantial increases were not good.

10 The appellant on the other hand was drawing a salary of $8,300.00 per month. In addition he had a private practice. The income from this source was not quantified but he admitted that he provided medical services to hotels in the island at US$100.00 per call. In addition he managed a family trucking business and was promoting an apartment building project on family land. No evidence of the income from these ventures was adduced. It is clear from the evidence that his income is substantially more than $8,300 per month and bearing in mind the recent date of his qualification the prospect of increases in his income is very good.

11 The evidence also revealed that the respondent had no capital assets in her own name. On the other hand the appellant owned an undivided one half share in two half acre parcels of land. There was no proof of the net value of this land but one parcel was stated to be subject to a mortgage of $48,000.00. The appellant also had the beneficial interest in fixed deposits of $32,000.00 and a motor car valued at $28,000.00 which was registered in his mother's name. In addition the respondent alleged that the appellant built a house on family land, and that it has a rental value of US$12,000.00 per annum which the appellant collected. The appellant did not admit these allegations. His evidence suggested that he had a beneficial interest in the house on the land but that the rental value was only US$375.00 per month. There was also evidence that the appellant was involved in a family trucking business and in the promotion of a family apartment building project. The capital value of these ventures was not given, but the appellant mentioned in his evidence that they were subject to secured loans in excess of two million dollars. The evidence concerning these assets was vague and imprecise.

12 The trial Judge did not give any reasons for the orders she made and as a result of this unsatisfactory situation we are not aware of the facts she found nor the factors which influenced her decision.

13 In WARD v. JAMES [1965] 1 All E.R. 563 Denning, M.R. said at p.570: –

“It sometimes happens that the Judge has given reasons which enable this Court to know the considerations which have weighed with him; but even if he has given no reasons, the court may infer from the way he has decided that the Judge must have gone wrong in one respect or another and will thereupon reverse his decision.”

14 I think that is open to the court to infer the trial Judge's reasons from the evidence before her and the orders she made, so as to determine whether the decision was in accord with principle or not.

15 We can conclude that the orders under appeal were made under the Matrimonial Proceedings and Property Act, 1990. The order for the payment of US$500.00 per month was made for the benefit of the children of the family under section 25(2)(a) which provides for the court to make:

“An order that a party to the marriage shall make to such person as may be specified in the order for the benefit of a child of the family, such a child, such periodical payments and for such term as may be...