Richardson v Richardson

• Jurisdiction: Anguilla
• Judge: Singh, J.A.
• Judgment Date: 21 June 1993
• Neutral Citation: AI 1993 CA 5
• Docket Number: Magisterial Civil Appeal No. 5 of 1992
• Date: 21 June 1993
• Court: Court of Appeal (Anguilla)

Court of Appeal

Floissac, C.J.; Singh, J.A.; Liverpool, J.A.

Magisterial Civil Appeal No. 5 of 1992

Richardson

and

Richardson

Appearances:

Mr. Thomas Astaphan for the Appellant.

Miss Palmavon Webster for the Respondent.

Tort - Negligence — Trial judge wrong in accepting the credibility of witnesses of the respondent — Magistrate allowed in special circumstances to accept or reject part of a witness's testimony — Award of damages set aside — Damages not proven — Nominal damages awarded.

Singh, J.A.

1 This is an Appeal from a decision of Magistrate Blackman questioning the learned Magistrate's finding of negligence against the appellant and his award of damages therefor. The appellant contends that the decision of the Magistrate on negligence was unreasonable and that there was no admissible evidence to justify the award of damages of E.C. $670.00.

2 On the issue of negligence, the Magistrate had before him evidence of the appellant's and the respondent's vehicles in a reversing manoeuvre which caused the collision. The learned Magistrate having seen and heard the witnesses preferred the evidence of the respondent over that of the appellant and found negligence on the part of the appellant. Learned Counsel for the appellant, challenges this preference of the Magistrate. He referred to certain discrepancies within and between the evidence of the respondent and his witness Merlyn Richardson and urged this Court to find the preference unreasonable. To put it more succinctly, Counsel for the appellant does not challenge the learned Magistrate's evaluation of the facts he found. The challenge is to the Magistrate's perception of the facts of the matter. The main thrust of his argument questioned the credibility of the witnesses whose evidence was accepted by the Magistrate.

3 The principles upon which a Court of Appeal will act in disturbing a decision of a tribunal on a question of fact were crystallised by the House of Lords in Benmax v. Austin Motor Company Limited [1955] 1 All E.R. 326 as follows:

“An appellate court on appeal from a case tried by a Judge alone, should not lightly differ from a finding of the trial Judge on a question of fact, but a distinction in this respect must be drawn between the perception of facts and the evaluation of facts.

Where there is no question of the credibility of witnesses, but the sole question is the proper inference to be drawn from specific facts, an appellate court is in as good a position to evaluate the evidence as the trial judge, and should form its own independent opinion, though it will give weight to the opinion of the trial judge.”

4 At p. 327 Viscount Simmonds made this observation:–

“This does not mean that an appellate court lightly differ from the finding of a trial judge on a question of fact, and I would say that it would be difficult for it to do so where the finding turned solely by on the credibility of a witness”

5 As earlier mentioned, the argument of Counsel for the appellant on the issue of liability centred mainly on the question of credibility. On this question we must recognise the advantages enjoyed by the trial tribunal over this Court. As Lord Reid puts it at 328 of Benmax V. Austin Motor Co, Ltd:

“But the trial judge has seen and heard the witness, whereas the appeal court is denied that advantage and only has before it a written transcript of their evidence. No one would seek to minimise the advantage enjoyed by the trial judge in determining any question whether a witness is, or is not, trying to tell what he believes to be the truth, and it is only in rare cases that an appeal...